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Summary
A question now facing many pension fund managers is whether or not some
type of fully-covered call option writing strategy should be pursued. This
study was designed to help provide an answer to this question by comparing
the risk and returns experienced by two buy-and-hold option portfolios to that
of the underlying stocks and of the stock market as a whole for the period
May 1973 through April 1977. The major conclusions are: 1) covered call
option writing provides a way to reduce the risk associated with an equity
portfolio, 2) no evidence was found to support the belief that a learning
period favorable to option writing existed during the first year or two of
CBOE existence, and 3) options are most likely to improve the risk-adjusted
returns of an equity portfolio during periods when overall market prices are
declining.
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INTRODUCTION
With the passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) of 19 74, investment managers and other fiduciaries of pension
funds have found themselves subject to vague, but potentially strict
standards of conduct. Among other requirements, ERISA provides that
individuals in charge of pension assets must act "with the care, skill,
prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a
prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters
would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with
like aims" [29 U.S.C.A., sec. 404(a) (1974)]. After citing this re-
quirement, some investment managers have suggested that pension plans
should consider writing exchange- traded call options on some or all of
the common stocks in their portfolios in order to derive additional in-
come from the securities portfolio and obtain some protection against
stock price declines.
Far from causing insurers and trust departments to rush to the
options market to write call options for their pension business, however,
ERISA's prudence requirement has usually been cited as a major reason
for not writing options. Some of the specific fears associated with
call writing by institutions have been: the absence of complete regu-
lator}' acceptance of such activity, the expenses associated with manag-
ing option portfolios, concerns over the alleged option trading abuses
which led to the temporary expansion moratorium imposed by the Securities
and Exchange Commission beginning in July 1977, the opportunity costs
associated with writing calls when the underlying stocks experience
large price increases, and the general unfamiliar ity that many managers
still feel with respect to options.
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Based on regulations for clarifying ERISA's prudence requirement
which were proposed by the Department of Labor in April 1978, it now
appears that the prudence of an individual investment will be evaluated
based on its role in the total portfolio, rather than on its ability
to "stand alone" as a justifiable investment. That is, no individual
investment vehicle should be considered imprudent, per se, if it can be
shown that the total portfolio strategy fits the needs of a particular
fund. Therefore, many of the aforementioned concerns about the propriety
of pension funds engaging in option writing may be unimportant if it can
be shown that the options play a viable role within a portfolio designed
to meet the needs of a particular fund.
Unfortunately, much of the information available about the results
of writing exchange-traded call options consists of one or two sentences
describing the generally favorable results that various banks have
achieved through pilot programs in option writing. Because only a few
details usually are supplied, these reports are of little help to the
manager of a pension fund seeking to determine the advisability of writ-
ing call options. Studies by Katz (1963), Boness (1964), and Malkiel
and Quandt (1969) were completed before options began trading on organ-
ized exchanges. Although all three studies generally were consistent
in demonstrating the undesirability of covered call writing, they are
of little relevance currently because they deal with an investment envir-
onment that changed drastically with the opening of the Chicago Beard
Options Exchange (CBOE) in April 1973. The expected premiums and liquidity
of call option contracts changed with the advent of exchange-traded calls,
and the number of different types of options decreased because of contract
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standardization. Finally, writers now retain all dividends, whereas
dividends benefited option buyers before the CBOE began operation.
A simulation study by Pounds (1978) and the Merton, Scholes, and
Glad stein work (1978) sought to help explain the expected risk and re-
turn patterns achievable through the use of options. However, both
works mixed the results from before and after the opening of the CBOE,
thus detracting from their relevance for the current environment. Three
studies have been done which restrict themselves to the period of interest
(April 26, 1973 and beyond), but they also are of limited use for insti-
tutions seeking evidence about the risk and return patterns available
through option writing. Roenfeldt, Cooley and Gombola (1976) examined
all CBOE options traded from April 1973 to January 1976, finding that
the returns from writing fully-covered calls were higher and the standard
deviations of returns were lower than for the underlying stocks. However,
by the end of the study period, 79 optionable common stocks were listed
on the CBOE; it is doubtful that pension fund managers would have written
options on all these securities, much less all the varieties of options
on all the underlying stocks. Similarly, because the Galai (1977) study
mixes the buying and writing of calls, it is not useful for institutions
which in many cases are prohibited from buying options. Trennepohl (1977)
included only 32 stocks in his study and restricted his time period to a
period after the opening of the CBOE, but the study is oversimplified
in that many unnecessary assumptions are made.
This study seeks to overcome these problems inherent in much of the
previous empirical work concerning option writing, in order to generate
evidence concerning the risk and returns associated with writing fully-
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covered, exchange traded call options. The study is particularly geared
to providing information useful to pension managers in judging whether
it would be prudent to write call options against stocks in their port-
folio.
DESIGN OF THE STUDY
The procedure used in this study was first to obtain a portfolio
of stocks typically held in pension fund accounts. Then option-writing
strategies were developed by identifying the percentage of the total
investment portfolio composed of common stocks which underlied call
option contracts. To illustrate, the 10 percent option strategy required
that options be written against 10 percent of the market value of the
stocks held in the portfolio. Both 10 and 30 percent strategies were
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examined." Portfolios were reevaluated at the end of each month and
when options expired, in order to make necessary changes to ensure that
the particular percentage strategies were maintained. The decision
rules and assumptions used in the study were chosen to reflect realism.
Rules which were infeasible or impractical to follow in the business
world were avoided in an attempt to develop results that are both mean-
ingful and useful to pension portfolio managers.
Option Strategy Decision Rules
For both the 10 and 30 percent option portfolios, the investor was
assumed to be a pension fund manager with $50 million to invest in an
equity portfolio on May 1, 1973. This money was allocated through a
market value weighting scheme designed to purchase a portfolio of Vickers
3Favorite Fifty stocks, as reported for December 31, 1972. This listing
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was the latest that would have been available at the time the stock port-
folio was initiated. Table 1 shows the 50 stocks and the percent of the
portfolio allocated to each one. It was assumed that only round lots
of stock were purchased and that the minimum commission rates for New
York Stock Exchange members in effect at that time were applicable.
Given these assumptions, there was $188,026 of the original $50 million
which was not allocated to purchase shares of common stock. This money
was placed in a "residual fund" which was invested at the Treasury-bill
interest rate until the fund was large enough to purchase a round lot of
each of the 50 stocks in the portfolio.
In writing options against these stocks, a volume requirement was
devised to avoid the unrealistic case in which several hundred contracts
for one type of option were assumed to be sold on a day when only a few
contracts actually were traded. Specifically, for any option that had
a contract volume of X on a certain day, no more than X/3 of that par-
ticular contract were written that day. Given this volume requirement,
stocks were chosen at random from the 50 held in the portfolio. To write
options against a chosen stock, the following rules were derived for
selecting strike prices and expiration dates for the contracts. The strike
price closest to and exceeding the current stock price was noted. If the
volume requirement was met, all options for the stock were written at this
strike price. If the volume requirement was not met, as many options as
possible were written at that price, and an attempt was made to write the
remaining options at the closest strike price below the current market price.
The procedure of writing options at the next highest strike price and
then the next lowest was followed until the recuired number of contracts
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for that particular stock were sold. For a given strike price, to the
extent allowed by the volume requirement, options were written for
the most distant expiration dates available.
The assumption was that the premium received upon writing an option
was that quoted in the Wall Street Journal for the day of the sale.
Transactions which occurred prior to May 1, 1975 were assumed to be
executed at the minimum commission levels specified by the Options
Clearing Corporation. All transactions which occurred after May 1, 1975
were charged a commission equal to two-thirds of the amount that would
have been charged had the transaction occurred before that date. Income
taxes were ignored throughout the study, because investment income gen-
erated by qualified pension funds usually is not taxable.
In the absence of dividend considerations, the assumption was that
options generally would not be exercised, if exercised at all, until just
before expiration. However, options sometimes were expected to be exer-
cised during the period after a dividend had been declared but before the
underlying stock was quoted ex-dividend. If, on any day during this
period, the sum of the closing price of the stock and its dividend ex-
ceeded the strike price plus the applicable commission, the assumption
was that the option would be exercised on the next trading day.
When the determination was made that an option would be exercised,
the pension fund management was assumed to close out its position on the
next trading day by purchasing the same option contract as an offset to
the one previously sold. Contracts also were closed out whenever the
premium for an outstanding option declined to a negligible level. A
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negligible level was defined as an amount less than or equal to 10 per-
cent of the premium received when the option was written, if the remain-
ing life of the option was at least one month. New options were written
when old ones expired, as long as the market values of the optioned stocks
had not increased to levels that exceeded the percentage strategy used.
The percentage strategies were reevaluated monthly. If, under the rules,
more options could be written, an optionable stock was chosen at random
and options were written. If too many options were in effect, optioned
stocks were chosen at random and their contracts were closed out in
amounts sufficient to maintain the desired percentage.
The residual fund used in connection with money left over after
purchasing the 50 stocks also was used to accumulate money received as
dividends and premiums for options sold. As stated, when sufficient
money had been accumulated to buy 100 shares of each of the 50 stocks
at the market prices then prevailing, the purchase was made. Because
a potential cash requirement always existed for closing out options, an
attempt was made to maintain the residual fund balance at no less than
$400,000. Even with this minimum target, the residual fund was insuf-
ficient a few times to fund the necessary close outs. In these cases,
money was borrowed on a short-term basis.
Stock Portfolio Decision Rules
The pure stock portfolio strategy was conducted similarly to the
option strategies. Fifty million dollars was allocated among the same
50 stocks on a market-weighted basis on May 1, 1973. Dividends received
from a stock were used to purchase as many shares of that particular stock
as possible, with any excess placed into a residual fund similar to that
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used with the option portfolios. Therefore, whereas only round lots
were purchased in the option portfolios, odd lots were acceptable under
the pure stock strategy. These few differences provided a benchmark for
comparisons, with the pure stock strategy being as equity-oriented as
possible at all times.
Market Portfolio Decision Rules
The S&P 500 strategy was used to relate the results of the other
portfolios to market conditions during the study period. It was assumed
that $50 million less commissions was invested at the index value on
May 1, 1973. Monthly dividends reported for the index in Moody's Annual
Dividend Record were assumed to be reinvested in the S&P 500. Although
actual minimum commissions were used in the option and stock strategies,
an arbitrary one percent commission was assumed prior to May 1, 1975
for the index strategy, with two-thirds of one percent assumed after that
date, because actual commissions would not have been feasible.
ANALYSIS
Various summary statistics relating to risk and return were computed
to help describe the results for each of the four alternative investment
strategies.
Return
The return for month i (r.) is calculated using the formula
P - P
_L i-1
r *
—
*zr
where P. is the value of the portfolio at the end of month i. The P.
values for the stock and option portfolios are the sums of the current
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market values for the stocks and the residual funds. The mean returns
for a particular n-month period were calculated using the formula
n
E r.
r = ,
where r. is the i monthly return.
Risk
Several different measures can be used to determine the riskiness
of a portfolio. The standard deviation a is estimated for an n-month
period according to the formula
o =
n
I (r - r)
i=l
-.2 2
n - 1
i_ —j
The results of some research efforts, including those by Mandelbrot
(1963, 1967), indicate that stock price returns may not be normally dis-
tributed. When a distribution is not normal, the mean absolute deviation
(MAD) has been suggested by Fama (1965) as the most suitable measure of
risk. It does not weigh large deviations more heavily than small ones,
as does the standard deviation, and has a higher degree of stability over
time. The formula for computing the MAC for an n-month period is
n
|
E r -r
i=l
MAD = —
n
Another measure of risk, the semi-standard deviation (SSO) , is con-
cerned only with deviations below a specified value, such as the mean,
median, zero, or the risk-free rate of return. The usual value used in
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the calculation is the mean. In this study the semi-standard deviation
is calculated for an n-month period as follows:
2
SSD =
n X,
I -A
fr. - r if r. - r <
where X .
1
|
if r - r >_ 0.
The calculation of beta is another measure of the relative risk of
the various portfolios. Beta is the 3 coefficient obtained in the
regression
r . = a + Br . cc „ + e.
,
i,p i,S&P l
where r. = i return on portfolio p (p = stock, 10% option, or 30%
option)
t* h
r. = i return on the market (S&P 500) portfolio
i
,
bar
e
.
= error term
l
a and $ = regression coefficients
One-Parameter Performance Measures
In order to assess the relative desirability of the four investment
strategies, several one-parameter performance measures are computed.
Three composite performance measures were developed by Jensen (1968),
Treynor (1965), and Sharpe (1966). All of these measures are based on
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and depend on the assumptions
of that model for their validity.
Jensen's measure is the a in Sharpe 's (1964) equation which is
sometimes referred to as the Securitv Market Line:
wh
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E(r.) - RFR = a + 6 4 [E(r ) - RPR], (1)1 i m
ere E(r ) = expected return for a security or portfolio
E(r ) = expected market return
m
RFR = risk-free rate of return
a and 3 = regression coefficients.
Although Sharpe's equation (1) was developed for expected returns, it
can be used to evaluate actual performance if g. is constant over time.
No problem is believed to be posed in this study by the assumption of a
constant beta. Only portfolios are considered, and portfolio betas
usually are more nearly stable than betas of individual securities
[see Blume (19 71)].
Equation (1) also can be rearranged to yield Treynor's T (1965) and
Sharpe's measure S (1966) of portfolio desirability:
E(r ) - RFR
1 —
E(r.) - RFR
S = i
a
r
i
T can be used to evaluate portfolios on an ex- post basis if both beta
and the risk-free rate are assumed to be constant. The use of S for
ex-post rankings requires the additional assumption that the standard
deviation of market returns is constant during the period.
Conceptually , both S and T represent risk premiums per unit of risk.
Based on this idea, two other one-parameter ranking methods can be
devised using the mean absolute deviation and the semi-standard deviation
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of returns as the risk measures [see Klemkosky (1973)]. These indices
are calculated as
:
MAD Index = r E~~MAD
and
7 - RPR
SSD Index = SSD
Some prior studies have questioned these one-parameter portfolio
performance measures. Specifically, several authors have contended that
they are biased. Friend and Blume (1970) found the Sharpe, Treynor,
and Jensen composite performance measures to be inversely related to
their risk measures, suggesting a bias against high-risk portfolios.
Klemkosky (1973), on the other hand, found evidence of a positive rela-
tionship between these three measures and risk. He also investigated
the bias of the MAD and SSD indices and found that these two measures
were less biased than the Sharpe, Treynor, and Jensen measures, leading
him to suggest that the MAD and SSD indices may be better risk-adjusted
performance indices. The Jensen measure also has been criticized recently
by Roll (19 78) for possible ambiguities depending upon how securities
are combined to form a portfolio. The current study constructed the
original portfolio based on a market-weighting scheme, which is consistent
with the theory behind the CAPM.
Even though the foregoing composite performance measures have been
criticized, they are used in this study. Although biases may be present
in some of the measures, the direction of the bias has not been estab-
lished. Some studies have found biases against high-risk portfolios,
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while some have found biases in favor of high-risk portfolios. In addi-
tion, at the present time no alternative performance measures have been
devised to evaluate the risk and return of a portfolio. Therefore, due to
a belief that returns should be viewed in relation to the risk assumed, the
composite performance measures are used to help appraise the study results.
RESULTS
Full Period Results
The summary statistics are presented in Table 2 for the full four-
year study period May 1973 through April 1977. The monthly risk-free
rate of return used was .0053, which was the average annual yield for
all newly issued three-month Treasury bills during this period (.0633)
divided by 12 to estimate the average monthly return of .0053.
The results shown in Table 2 offer no support for a conclusion
that covered call option writing is a desirable activity for managers
of pension funds, since the risk-adjusted performance becomes poorer as
more options are written. Further analysis of Table 2 indicates that
the inferior risk-adjusted performance of the option strategies is pri-
marily a result of the return components. The option portfolios gener-
ally had lower risk associated with them than did the stock portfolio (as
gauged by the majority of risk measures) . In addition, the 30 percent
strategy produced a lower risk portfolio than did the 10 percent strategy.
Thus, although writing options decreased the risk, the return also declined.
This lower return was sufficient to cause inferior risk-adjusted returns
for the option portfolios.
These results are in contrast with the generally favorable results
for option writing on organized exchanges, as reported by Roenfeldt,
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Cooley, and Gombola (1976), Pounds (1978), Trennepohl (1977), and the
bank pilot programs. The results also conflict with the findings of
Merton, Scholes, and Gladstein (MSG) (1978), who found that the risk-
adjusted returns for their option strategies were better than those of
the S&P 500, although their pure stock strategies performed best in
most cases. The conflict, however, does not exist with respect to all
the results. MSG and others found the option portfolios to have lower
risk than the stock alternative, as is the result in the current study.
The differences could be explained by the attempt to make the current
study realistic by restricting the stock sample to institutional favor-
ites and by limiting the study period to the time since the opening of
the CBOE. The recognition of transaction costs probably is a major
factor influencing the results; several of the previously discussed
4
studies did not consider commissions. Such expenses reduced the return
component of the risk-adjusted measures, causing the options portfolios
to perform poorly relative to the S&P 500 and the pure stock strategy
for the study period.
Learning Period Effects
As noted, the opening of the CBOE in April 1973 changed the market
for the buying and selling of call options. Given the innovations in
call option trading that accompanied the opening, abnormal results were
expected during the period required for investors to familiarize them-
selves with options and the CBOE. In particular, because many observers,
;uch as Laing (1976) , felt premium levels were much higher during the
'st year, it was anticipated that option results would be best for the
: months of the study period, referred to here as the "learning period."
-15-
If a CBOE learning period of about a year influenced the overall
results, that influence should be reflected in a comparison of the first
year results (Table 3) with those for the final three years (Table 4)
.
Most of the performance measures rated the market portfolio as the least
desirable of the four strategies for the first year. However, the
superior performance of the pure stock portfolio, compared to both
options strategies, supports the tentative conclusion that writing
options may not be beneficial. The failure of the 10 and 30 percent
strategies to out-perform the underlying stocks during the first year
was surprising given the claims that first-year returns from writing
options should be good because premium levels were high and the market
was not yet efficient. In contrast to the first-year results, the per-
formance rankings for the final three-year period were almost identical
to those for the full four-year period. Again the market portfolio
performed best and the two option writing strategies performed worst
on a risk-adjusted basis.
A review of the component parts of the performance measures shows
that the first-year returns for the options strategies were no better,
relative to the alternatives, than they were for the remaining three
years. However, during this latter three-year period, the risk asso-
ciated with the option portfolios generally was lower than that for
the pure stock portfolio and the S&P 500. These two observations sup-
port the analysis of the combined performance ineasures. That is, there
is no evidence of favorable option-writing results during a one-year
learning period.
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The results contained in Tables 5 and 6 can be compared for evidence
of learning period effects for the first two years versus the remaining
two years. A major difference between the two-year and the one-year
learning period analysis is that the market portfolio was the best per-
former the first two years, whereas it was the least desirable portfolio
strategy for the first year alone. The relative return performance of
the option strategies was similar for the two periods. The risk com-
ponent, however, was lower for the options portfolios in the final two-
year period (relative to the alternatives) than in the first two years.
These results are consistent with the analysis for a one-year learning
period. There is no evidence that a two-year learning period was bene-
ficial for an option writing strategy, since both options portfolios
were generally inferior to the alternatives.
Results bv Market Periods
The study by MSG (1978) found that a fully-covered option writing
strategy performs best during stable market conditions. In order to
analyze the effects of market conditions in the current study, the four-
year period was divided into subperiods representing rising, declining,
and stable market conditions. Based upon a study by Wachowicz (1978),
which deals with the volatility of the S&P 500 on a daily basis, the
following subperiods were chosen:
Type of Market Sub period Dates
Stable (#1) May 1973-October 19 73
Declining November 1973-November 1974
Rising December 1974-January 1976
Stable (#2) February 1976-April 1977.
table Market Periods . Based upon the MSG work and the decision
used in this study, the expectation was that the options portfolios
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would perform best during periods when stock prices remained steady.
During declining market periods, options were more likely to be closed
out under the "low premium" rule, and when stock prices increased,
options were more likely to be closed out to avoid losing the stock to
satisfy an exercise notice and to retain the flow of dividends. But
when stock prices remained stable, the option premiums were expected
to increase the return for the option portfolios without an offsetting
drain. Tables 7 and 8 present the results for Stable Market Period I
(May 19 73 through October 1973) and Stable Market Period II (February
1976 through April 1977).
The expectations were not fulfilled during Stable Market Period I
and were only partially realized for Stable Market Period II. For the
six months included in Stable Market Period I, the pure stock and market
portfolios were ranked the highest on a risk-adjusted basis (the pre-
ferences between the pure stock and market portfolios varied by indices)
,
This result was not expected based on the MSG study, but it is generally
consistent with the previously reported rankings for other subperiods.
Both a relatively higher risk component and lower return accounted for
the differences among the rankings. Stable Market Period II included
fifteen months and occurred after the options exchanges had achieved a
greater degree of maturity. Thus, Stable Market Period II seems more
representative of future results expected in steady markets. For this
period, the market portfolio strategy was the least desirable, although
the pure stock portfolio was ranked consistently ahead of both options
strategies on a risk-adjusted basis. Although the findings of the MSG
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study suggest that the option writing portfolios should have outperformed
the buy-and-hold stock alternative during this period, the results of
the present study did not support this expectation. Comparing the
results for the stock and options portfolios only, the return component
seems to be responsible for the inferior rankings of the options port-
folios. As observed for some other subperiods, the options strategies
generally had lower risk associated with them than did the stock alter-
native for Stable Market Period II.
Declining Market Period . The Katz (1963) and Trennepohl (1977)
studies indicated that option writing may be most profitable during
declining market periods. Table 9 presents the results associated with
the declining market period (November 1973 through November 1974) . The
results are compatible with those of Katz and Trennepohl. Even though
the S&P 500 strategy ranks highest on a risk-adjusted basis, the results
provide some evidence that a program of option writing can improve re-
sults on a risk-adjusted basis. The portfolio performance indices con-
sistently ranked the 30 percent options portfolio ahead of the 10 per-
cent strategy, and both options portfolios were superior to the pure
stock alternative. Such relative rankings are experienced in no other
subperiod. It appears that the superior performance of the 30 percent
strategy relative to the 10 percent and pure stock alternatives is due
to the return component. The risk for the 10 percent and stock port-
folios was less than that for the 30 percent strategy, but the relatively
higher return component for the 30 percent strategy caused it to be
superior in the composite sense.
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Rising Market Period . The options portfolios were expected to per-
form worst, relative to the market and pure stock portfolios, during a
rising market period. MSG believed that the unrealized stock price gains
would cause option strategies to perform poorly relative to the under-
lying stocks in rising markets. Katz and Trennepohl both found some
evidence to support this belief. As noted, the decision rules used in
this study allowed for option closeouts to avoid losing the stock through
an exercise notice (either just before expiration or during the life of
the option if the exercise would be for dividend-related reasons) . Both
these types of closeouts are more likely during rising market periods.
Thus, the return component for the options portfolios was expected to be
adversely affected by the cost of buying back the option and by the
additional commission charges.
The results for the rising market period (December 1974 through
January 1976) are presented in Table 10. In constrast to the declining
market results, the 30 percent strategy was the least desirable on a
risk-adjusted basis during the rising market period. This result was
due to its poor return, which offsets the fact that the 30 percent port-
folio had the lowest risk during this period. The 10 percent portfolio
was generally ranked above the pure stock alternative, although the
rankings were not consistent. Notably, the market portfolio was superior
to all other strategies. The reason for the inferior returns for the
30 percent strategy is that during a period of generally rising stock
prices, the 30 percent options portfolio experienced more closeouts just
before expiration than during stable or declining market conditions. In
addition, closeouts due to dividends also were heavy during this rising
market period.
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CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Unfortunately, the results of this study cannot be cited as clear
evidence in favor of or against the strategy of writing covered call
options for most pension plans. However, the investment goals of pen-
sion plans depend on the characteristics of the plans; therefore, the
desirability of including any particular investment vehicle within the
portfolio of a given plan can be judged only by considering the role of
that vehicle within the total portfolio, always in the context of the
overall fund objectives. In this sense, to make judgments about writing
calls, information about the expected risk and return from writing
options is necessary. This study was designed to provide such informa-
tion. The specific conclusions of the study, along with their implica-
tions for pension managers, are as follows:
Risk
The principal conclusion of the study is that writing covered call
options seems to provide a strategy for reducing the risk associated
with an equity portfolio, compared to the alternative of holding only
the underlying stocks. Furthermore, the risk of the portfolio typically
declines when more options are written, although this observation was
not true for the declining market period observed in this study. A
comparison of the risk of option portfolios to the aggregate market
risk indicates that covered option writing appears to be a lower risk
strategy whenever the market is active—either upward or downward.
This conclusion regarding risk should be important to pension plan
anagers and sponsors concerned about the variability of contributions
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to the plan. Reduced risk for the investment returns should improve the
predictability of the periodic contributions required from the sponsoring
firm. Those plans with relatively low risk objectives include plans
which are not fully funded, plans sponsored by unprofitable firms, and
plans that include a large percentage of older workers.
Return
The returns associated with the options portfolios generally were
lower than the return for the underlying stocks, except during the de-
clining market period. The returns also generally were lower than that
for the market, except during one of the stable market periods. Pension
portfolio managers interested in writing covered call options must
expect generally lower returns than are possible with a portfolio
of the underlying stocks only. Given the lower risk expectations, a
lower expected return is not surprising. However, this conclusion in-
dicates that plan sponsors who hope to use high investment returns to
increase or improve plan benefits should not engage in covered call
option writing.
Plan managers interested in writing options can modify some of the
decision rules used in this study to improve the expected return. For
example, a major drain on the option returns resulted from option close
outs. Money was required to repurchase the contract and to pay the
associated commissions. Many dividend-related close outs, as well
as several which occurred at expiration, could be eliminated by
writing only out-of-the-money options. In addition, returns would
be increased by eliminating the close outs due to negligible pre-
miums. A final suggestion for improving returns is to maintain
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a larger balance in the 30 percent residual fund in order to eliminate
the interest expense associated wilth borrowing money when the residual
fund is insufficient to support necessary transactions. A minimum level
of $900,000 appears to be more appropriate than the $400,000 level used
in this study. However, if some of the close outs are eliminated through
the preceding suggestions, a $400,000 level should net be a problem.
Learning Period
This study found no evidence to support the widely-held belief that
the early period (one or two years, for example) of the CBOE existence
was a learning period during which institutional option writers could
have obtained much better results than were possible later. On a risk-
adjusted basis, the results for the first one or two year period did
not differ significantly from later results. Therefore, pension managers
should not decide against option writing merely because of concerns
over premium levels which are lower than those obtainable the first
year
.
Market Conditions
This study found that options are most likely to improve the risk-
adjusted returns of an equity portfolio during periods when overall
market prices are declining. The results during periods of stable and
rising market conditions indicated that options generally were inferior
to the alternatives, on a risk-adjusted basis. This conclusion about
the relative desirability of writing options during various market
periods is important for pension managers who vary investment strategies
according to forecasted market conditions.
-23-
The principal contribution of this research is its provision of a
meaningful "starting point" for pension fund managers debating the
advisability of option writing. With respect to overall market condi-
tions, managers should be able to use the results for the study period
(May 1973 through April 1977) as an aid in forecasting the expected
risks and returns available by writing options against stocks in their
portfolio
.
-24-
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FOOTNOTES
Pound's study period is from 1969 through 1976, while MSG look
at the period from July 1963 through December 1975.
uue to the low volume of options traded during the early months
of CBOE operation, it was impossible to attain these percentages imme-
diately. Therefore, as many options as possible were written on May 1,
1973, making the ratio of the market value of the optioned securities
to the total value of all the stocks held only 3.7 percent. By continu-
ing to write the maximum number of contracts allowable each day, this
figure was increased to 10 percent by June 1, 1973. The 30 percent level
was not attained until April 1, 1974.
3
This group represents the 50 largest holdings of major bank
trust departments, as compiled and reported by Vickers Associates, Inc.
4
For the overall study period, the commissions paid at the time
new options were written equalled .0201 of the gross premiums received
for the 10 percent option strategy and .0197 of gross premiums for the
30 percent option portfolio. To estimate the effect of commissions paid
when option contracts were closed out, May 1976 was chosen at random and
the average commission costs were computed. During this month, the
average commission paid per close-out transaction was $151.08, and the
average commission per contract closed out was $5.83.
-27-
TABLE 1
STOCKS INCLUDED IN THE STUDY
Percent of
Portfolio
Stock Allocated
1. IBM
2. GM
3. Xerox
4. Exxon
5. Ford
6. E. Kodak
7. ATT
8. Philip Morris
9. GE
10. Polaroid
11. Burroughs
12. ITT
13. McDonald's
14. Texaco
15. Avon
16. Kresge
17. Mobil
18. MGIC
19. Sears
20. DuPont
21. Minn. Mining & Man.
22. RCA
23. Kerr-McGee
24. Westinghouse
25. Texas Instruments
26. St. Oil of Calif.
27. Atl. Richfield
28. Continential Oil
29. Travelers
30. Chrysler
31. Union Carbide
32. Warner-Lamb er
t
33. Aetna
34. First Nat'l City
35. Northwest Airlines
36. Sony
37. Imperial Oil
38. Union Pacific
39. Gillette
40. CBS
41. Sperry Rand
42. Delta
43. Matsuchita
44. Phillips Petr.
45. Goc dy ear
46. Deere & Co.
47. Digital Equip.
48. GTE
49. Procter & Gamble
50. Schering-Plough
14.8%
6.3
3.5
6.6
1.9
6.7
8.9
1.0
3.4
1.3
1.3
1.0
0.7
3.3
2.3
1.4
2.1
0.4
4.7
2.5
2.7
0.6
0.5
0.9
0.6
2.2
1.1
0.5
0.4
0.5
0.8
1.2
0.5
1.3
0.2
0.9
1.5
0.4
0.5
0.3
0.4
0.4
0.8
1.1
0.6
0.3
0.3
1.0
2.5
1.1
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TABLE 2
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR PERIOD MAY 1973-APRIL 1977*
Portfolio
Statistic Stocks 10% Option 30% Option S&P 500
Mean return .0013 .0010 .0010 .0028
Standard deviation .0552 .0549 .0547 .0543
Beta .9429 .9502 .9297 1.0000
MAD .0415 .0417 .0409 .0401
SSD .0383 .0378 .0375 .0354
Sharpe's index -.0725 -.0783 -.0786 -.0460
Treynor ' s index -.0042 -.0045 -.0046 -.0025
MAD index -.0964 -.1031 -.1051 -.0623
SSD index -.1044 -.1138 -.1146 -.0706
Jensen's measure -.0017 -.0019 -.0020 0.0000
*The average RFR is .0053.
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TABLE 3
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR FIRST YEAR
(MAY 1973-APRIL 1974)*
Portfolio
Statistic Stocks 10% Option 30% Option S&P 500
Mean return -.0140 -.0141 -.0140 -.0114
Standard deviation .0493 .0489 .0485 .0391
Beta 1.0954 1.1036 1.0951 1.0000
MAD .0350 .0337 .0336 .028 7
SSD .0377 .0371 .0371 .0308
Sharpe's index -.4138 -.4192 -.4206 -.4552
Treynor's index -.0186 -.018 6 -.0186 -.0178
MAD index -.5829 -.6083 -.6071 -.6202
SSD index -.5411 -.5525 -.5499 -.5779
Jensen's measure -.0009 -.0009 -.0009 0.0000
*The average RFR is .0064.
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TABLE 4
SUMMARY STATISTICS
(MAY 1974-
FOR LAST THREE
APRIL 1977)*
YEARS
Portfolio
Statistic Stocks 10% Option 30% Option S&P 500
Mean return .0064 .0060 .0060 .0075
Standard deviation .0562 .0559 .0557 .0577
Beta .9160 .9236 .9009 1.0000
MAD .0438 .0440 .0427 .0444
SSD .0384 .0380 .0376 .0371
Sharpe's index .0267 .0197 .0197 .0451
Treynor's index .0016 .0012 .0012 .0026
MAD index .0342 .0250 .0258 .0586
SSD index .0391 .0289 .0293 .0701
Jensen's measure -.009 -.0013 -.0013 0.0000
*The average RFR is .0049.
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TABLE 5
SUMMAKZ STATISTICS FOR FIRST TWO YEARS
(MAY 197-APRIL 1975)*
Portfolio
Statistic Stocks 10% Option 30% Option S&P 500
Mean return -.0064 -.0063 -.0064 -.0035
Standard deviation .0680 .0675 .0679 .0649
Beta 1.0056 1.0011 1.0080 1.0000
MAD .0511 .0511 .0512 .0478
SSD .0459 .0452 .0453 .0417
Sharpe ' s index -.1353 -.1852 -.1356 -.1495
Treynor's index -.0125 -.0125 -.0125 -.0097
MAD index -.2466 -.2446 -.2461 -.2029
SSD index -.2745 -.2765 -.2781 -.2326
Jensen's measure -.0029 -.0028 -.0029 0.0000
*The average RFR is .0062.
-32-
TABLE 6
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR LAST TWO YEARS
(MAY 1975-APRIL 1977)*
Portfolio
Statistic Stocks 10% Cation 30% Option S&P 500
Mean return .0090 .0082 .0084 .0091
Standard deviation .0369 .0370 .0354 .0399
Beta .7626 .8052 .7096 1.0000
MAD .0321 .0320 .0301 .0323
SSD .02A8 .0249 .0235 .0247
Sharpe's index .1274 .1054 .1153 .1203
Treynor's index .0062 .0048 .0058 .0048
MAD index .1464 .1219 .1362 .1486
SSD index .1895 .1566 .1745 .1943
Jensen's measure .0010 .0001 .0006 0.0000
*The average RFR is .0043,
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TABLE 7
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR STABLE MARKET PERIOD I
(MAY 1973-OCTOBER 1973)*
Portfolio
Statistic Stocks 10% Option 30% Option S&P 500
Mean return .0012 -.0006 -.0003 .0031
Standard deviation .0540 .054 2 .0523 .0298
Beta 1.4642 1.5565 1.4915 1.0000
MAD .0365 .0384 .0372 .0256
SSD .0417 .0411 .0399 .0199
Sharpe's index -.0963 -.1292 -.1281 -.1107
Treynor ' s index -.0036 -.0045 -.0045 -.0033
MAD index -.1425 -.1823 -.1801 -.1289
SSD index -.1247 -.1703 -.1679 -.1658
Jensen's measure -.0004 -.0019 -.0018 0.0000
*The average RFR is .0064,
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TABLE 3
SUMMARY STATISTICS
(FEBRUARY
FOR STABLE MARKET PERIOD II
197 6-APRIL 1977)*
Portfolio
Statistic Stocks 10% Option 30% Option S&P 500
Mean return .0070 .0052 .0068 .0019
Standard deviation .0299 .0295 .0283 .0261
Beta .9774 1.0199 .9325 1.0000
MAD .0262 .0257 .0245 .0205
SSD .0189 .0191 .0181 .0162
Sharpe's index .0970 .0373 .0954 -.0843
Tr eynor ' s index .0030 .0011 .0029 -.0022
MAD index .1107 .0428 .1102 -.1073
SSD index .153^ .05 76 .1492 -.1358
Jensen's measure .0050 .0034 .0048 0.0000
*The average RFR is .0041.
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TABLE 9
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR DECLINING MARKET PERIOD
(NOVEMBER 1973-NOVEMBER 1974)*
Portfolio
Statistic Stocks 10% Option 30% Option S&P 500
Mean return -.0316 -.0307 -.0305 -.0272
Standard deviation .0671 .0661 .0681 .0695
Beta .9578 .9414 .9658 1.0000
MAD .04 79 .0482 .0492 .0480
SSD .0403 .0396 .0405 .04 02
Sharpe's index -.5693 -.5643 -.5448 -.3558
Tr eynor ' s index -.0399 -.0396 -.0384 -.0338
MAD index -.7975 -.7739 -.7541 -.7042
SSD index -.9479 -.9419 -.9160 -.8408
Jensen's measure -.0058 -.0054 -.0045 0.0000
*The average RFR is .0066.
-36-
TABLE 10
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR RISING MARKET PERIOD
(DECEMBER 1974-JANUARY 1976)*
Portfolio
Statistic Stocks 10% Option 30% Option S&P 500
Mean return .0258 .0265 .0244 .0315
Standard deviation .0493 .0499 .0491 .0533
Beta .8231 .8535 .7960 1.0000
MAD .0403 .0406 .0375 .0434
SSD .0345 .0349 .0330 .0372
Sharpe ' s index .4239 .4329 .3971 .4991
Treynor's index .0254 .0253 .0245 .0266
MAD index .5186 .5320 .5200 .6129
SSD index .6058 .6189 .5909 .7151
Jensen's measure -.0010 -.0011 -.0016 0.0000
*The average RFR is .0049.
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